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ABSTRACT

Syndication is a major factor in the market for television programming. These
papers analyze the effects of the off-network syndication market on prime time
programming decisions that are made by broadcast networks. The first paper investigates
the effects of the off-network syndication (rerun) market on the optimal number of
seasons for a prime time television series. The theoretical model predicts that syndication
could potentially either increase the number of seasons if the price elasticity of demand
for syndication is elastic or vice versa. The empirical analysis consists of a duration
model and estimates the effects of first run ratings and syndication on the probability that
the show will not be cancelled in that season. The second paper proposes that the
removal of the Financial Interest and Syndication Rules in 1995 changed the incentives
for the networks to air more reality programming even if these programs are less popular
and receive lower ratings than dramatic programs. This hypothesis is evaluated using a
model borrowed from Wildman and Robinson (1995), a profit maximization model as
well as a stock and flow model to help explain the timing of the shift. A simple t-test
does show that the average amount of reality programming is significantly different (and
higher) after the Fin-Syn Rules were revoked. In addition, the regression analysis
indicates that there is a shift in the number of seasons that the average syndicated
program is aired during the first run.
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CHAPTER ONE
TO CANCEL OR NOT TO CANCEL:
SYNDICATION AND THE OPTIMAL LENTGH OF A PROGRAM
Introduction
The television industry is a complex and dynamic world, involving many players.
Networks interact with producers, advertisers and local stations to entertain, inform, and
educate people in a modern world. Diverse television content can be found 24 hours a
day on an ever growing number of channels. Each time period and channel has different
goals and therefore, different content. Because of the complexity of the overall market,
the focus here is narrowed to programming on the major broadcast networks during the
time period referred to as prime time1 and the possibility of those programs to be
syndicated on local stations outside of prime time.
A television show starts with a producer, who creates the show and sells it to a
network, who schedules it to be aired during a particular time slot on their affiliated
stations2. When producers set out to create a television series, particularly dramatic
programming3, evidence shows that the first season of a show will probably not bring in a
profit. In fact, it will likely bring a loss, because of the high fixed costs of creating a new
show. The producers may not recover the costs of the show at all during its first run4,
unless the show is very popular. Until recently, producers hoped that the series would
make it to about 100 episodes (usually between 4 and 5 seasons), when it would have the
best potential to be syndicated on other networks.
1

Prime time is considered to be Sunday 7pm until 11pm and 8pm until 11pm for the rest of the week.
See Appendix A for a diagram the primary market structure during the time period of the data used in this
paper.
3
Dramatic programming includes situation comedies as well as drama series.
4
A first run is the original airing of the show as a new episode.
2

1

What exactly is syndication? In the television industry, syndication is defined as
the process of selling programs to individual local television stations. The local stations
use these programs to help fill time when there is no network programming provided.
There are two specific types of syndication that are relevant to the television industry.
One is first run syndication, which includes shows that are made specifically to sell to
individual television stations and are never aired nationally by a network. First run
syndication includes shows such as Oprah and Jeopardy. The other type of television
syndication is called off network syndication and is the type of syndication that will be
referred to as syndication for the rest of this paper. Off network syndication is the
process of selling reruns of a network show that originally aired during network prime
time to the local stations. Off network syndication is the way that many television series
make most of their money. Syndication, including first run as well as off network, is an
almost $3 billion a year business (Berman 2007). One of a producer’s biggest hopes is to
get a piece of this rather large pie.
The theory presented in this paper is that syndication may change the number of
seasons that producers choose to make if the number of seasons affects the lifetime
profits of the show. People may argue that it is ultimately the networks decision whether
to keep the program or not. However, the producer can influence the decision of the
network by adjusting the price that they would accept from the network for the show.
Syndication could affect the number of seasons in two ways. One way depends on the
price elasticity of demand for syndication and the other depends on shifts in demand.
The price elasticity of demand is the focus of the analysis of this paper.
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If the price elasticity of demand is low, or inelastic, syndication could decrease
the number of seasons that are made because as new seasons are created the producers
dilute the market for their reruns, and therefore, they drive down the price that they can
charge for syndicating the show. In this case, an additional season actually reduces
lifetime profits because it drives the price of syndication down so much that their profits
from syndication fall by more than the profits they receive from the new season.
However, if more seasons do not drive down the price significantly or if demand is elastic,
they are able to make more seasons than would be profitable without syndication and
increase their lifetime profits by making additional seasons.
The other possibility is that shifts in the demand for syndication could change the
ideal number of seasons that a producer should make. In this case, high demand for
syndication would increase the number of seasons that would be profitable. Decreases in
demand would decrease the number of seasons that are made. The demand for
syndication or reruns is dependent upon the type of show and the popularity; so different
shows may optimize by creating more seasons than others.
Wildman and Robinson (1995) did a thorough analysis of the market for
syndication and what makes a show successful in syndication. One of their main findings
is a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the number of episodes squared in
a regression with syndication ratings as the dependent variable. This supports their
theory that there is a declining marginal syndication profit from new episodes. They also
claim that this will possibly cause the cancellation of a show before the ratings for the
show start to fall. The theory and model presented in this paper is an extension of the
theory presented by Wildman and Robinson.

3

Analysis of the theoretical model presented here gives the same results for
diminishing marginal profits or an inelastic price elasticity of demand. However, there
could be a more complex result. It is possible that for low numbers of episodes the
marginal contributions will be increasing to profits, such that up to a certain point
syndication will cause a show to run longer and that after this point the opposite will
happen. In other words, the proposed theory is that the price elasticity of demand for
syndication is elastic for low numbers of episodes and becomes more inelastic for larger
numbers of episodes. Based on market observations, the expected break point will likely
be around the 100 episode mark (approximately 4 to 5 seasons).
Duration models are often used to analyze the probability of a particular event
happening over the course of time. Therefore, a duration model is a good fit for
analyzing this problem, where the event, or death as it is often referred, would be the
cancelation of the show. The probit model is used to predict the probability that a show
will not end in any given period depending whether it has been syndicated or not. Two
probit models are analyzed, one for syndicated series and one for non-syndicated series.
The cumulative probability of being canceled in any given season is calculated based on
the estimated probit models and compared. The results show that syndicated shows are
less likely to be canceled in seasons one through six. Then after season seven a
syndicated show is more likely to be canceled. Thus the theoretical models predicts that
shows that are syndicated have a more elastic demand for seasons at a lower number of
seasons and a more inelastic demand at a higher number of seasons.
In the next section of the paper, a brief history of the market for syndication is
covered. Then in the following section, the model is presented and solved. Then the
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preliminary data and analysis is discussed, which is followed by the empirical. The paper
concludes in the final section.
History
Although there was some television programming prior, the real start of regular
network programs was in 1946 (Brooks and Marsh 1995). Originally, television shows
were broadcast live, but in the late 1950s stations switched to filmed programming
(Museum 2007). This is when second showings and syndication were discovered by the
networks (Museum 2007). Therefore, until this time, there was no market for syndication
at all.
Most non-dramatic shows, including game shows, news programs, and reality
shows, have not seen much action from the syndication market. The market for
syndication is usually the largest for television shows aired during the prime time
viewing hours, particularly sitcoms (Caves 2005). The Financial Interest and Syndication
Rules, from the late 1960s to the mid 1990s, actually ensured that the rights to the
program went back to the producers after so many network runs (Museum 2007).
Therefore, the “extra” income generated from syndicating television programs may give
producers the incentive to create shows that are not profitable in the first run. In fact, it is
not unusual for only 80-85% of the costs to be recovered from the original network
licensing fee (Vogel 2001).
Syndication is generally reached after 4 or 5 seasons of original network air time.
This is because the most popular type of syndication is strip or daily syndication, which is
where they run the show, typically, five days a week at the same time. This requires
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more episodes than airing the show once a week, and therefore, they want a minimum
number of episodes for this type of syndication.
Strip syndication was particularly useful for cable networks. When many of the
cable networks were new, it was easier for them to run syndicated programs rather than
produce their own (Caves 2005). The growth of the number of cable networks thus
increased the demand for syndication over the years starting around the late 1970s and
early 1980s.
When a network buys the license to syndicate a series, they usually buy the rights
for all of the episodes (Caves 2005). The first syndication contract for a series is usually
entered into after about four seasons, as mentioned previously, but before the series is
finished with its first run (Caves 2005). Therefore, when producers are making the
decision about how many seasons to make they have at least some information as to what
the show is worth in syndication. The price for these contracts is usually listed per
episode; as either a monetary amount or the right to sell ad time during the show, stated
in minutes (Caves 2005). This and the fact that dating on contracts for syndication is not
widely available make the price of syndication hard to identify empirically.
Now consider what types of shows are most likely to be syndicated. Because
shows often run daily during syndication, it is more likely that a viewer may miss an
episode. This makes self contained plot lines good for syndication. If the plot lines carry
over significantly from episode to episode, it may be hard for occasional viewers to enjoy
the show. This could be one reason that a show similar to Seinfeld, the self-proclaimed
show about nothing, does so well in syndication. Although there may be some carry over
of plot lines, most of the humor comes across even if you have never seen any of the
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preceding episodes. Sitcoms, in general are known for being good at this. Another type
of show that has done well with reruns is crime dramas, such as Law & Order, likely,
because they also have self contained plot lines. On the other hand, shows like 24 which
rely heavily on understanding previous episodes may not do quite as well in the
syndication market.
Theoretical Model and Solution
The hypothesis of this paper is analyzed with a lifetime profit function for a
television series. It consists of two main parts: first, the profits from the first run of the
program and second, the profits from syndication in other markets. The profits from the
first run are made up of the revenues from the initial broadcasting network licensing fee
minus the costs of producing the show. Syndication is assumed to have no extra costs
and is therefore pure profit. This is due to the fact that the costs of syndication are
minimal in relation to the production costs of the series.
The revenue from creating a new season of the series has been simplified to a
function of quality in that season, qt, and price, pt, which is being defined as the amount
that the networks are willing to pay for quality, where t denotes the season number.

The

quality of the show might include such things as the notoriety and quality of the actors, as
well as the quality of the writers, set designers and wardrobe staff. The price in this
model is exogenous for simplification. Therefore, revenue for an individual season is the
following:
(1) Rt  pt qt .
The cost function is quadratic in quality and includes a significant fixed cost.
Therefore, the marginal cost is increasing in quality (i.e., higher quality is more
7

expensive, and it is more expensive to hire better writers, actors, etc.). In the model,

represents a shifter for the cost of quality of different types of shows. It is cheaper to
increase the quality of reality shows compared to dramatic programming. Therefore
those two types of shows may have different ’s. here is also a high fixed cost, ct, to
producing the season, which may include renting the studio space and filming equipment
as well as many other items. The cost function is represented as the following:

(2) Ct 

1 1  2

 q t  ct .
2  t (  t ) 

Equations (1) and (2) combined yield a profit function for an individual season that
simplifies to the following:




1
1 1  2

.



p
q

q

c
(3)  t  
t
t
t
t
t 1 
 t (  t ) 

2


1

r





This includes a discount rate for a season in the future, which is an interest rate
represented by r.
The inverse demand function for syndicated seasons is
(4) st  k (t  1)   , for 5  t  T , where   0 and k  0 ,
and
(5) st  kT   , for t  T ,
where st is the price for which producers can sell syndicated seasons.

The inverse

demand function shifts around depending on the value of k and  which may vary for
different types of shows, k is a scalar or demand shifter and  is the inverse of the price
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elasticity of demand for syndicated seasons. Only previously aired seasons are
considered eligible for syndication, therefore the number of seasons sold is t-1, while the
final new season is denoted as T.
Putting all of this together yields the following lifetime profit function for the
producer of a show:
T 

 T  1 
 1 
1 
1 1  2
 pt qt  




s T .

q

c

s
(
t

1
)

(6)    

t
t  

t 1 
t 1  t
t 1  t
2  t (  t ) 
t 1  1  r 
t T 1  (1  r )

 t 5  (1  r ) 


In this model, it is assumed that producers can begin selling the series in syndication after
the fourth season. Therefore, revenues from syndication are considered starting in the
fifth season and the future revenue from syndication is also discounted.
This simplified model enables a closed form solution, and it is still useful in
analyzing the optimal ending point for a series. First the optimal number of seasons is
determined when syndication is not a factor and then compared to the optimal decision
when syndication is included.
In the case where syndication is not considered, the lifetime profit function for
creating the series and the first run airing is
T 


1
1 1  2
 p q  
qt  ct  ,
(7)  n   
t 1  t t
2  t (  t ) 
t 1  1  r 



where t=1,2,3…T is the time period, and the first season is the current period. The
subscript n indicates that this is for first run only. There are two choice variables in this
profit function; one is the quality of the season, and the other is the number of seasons
that they produce.
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First, to find the optimal level of quality for a season, the first derivative of
equation (3) with respect to qt is considered:

(8)


 t 

1
1
 p 
 
qt  .
t 1  t
qt  (1  r ) 
t (  t ) 

By setting the derivative equal to zero and solving for qt, optimal value for the quality of
a season is determined to be given by the following:
(9) qt  pt (t  t 2 ) .
The quadratic nature of the quality of the show as time passes suggests that there is a
learning curve, so to speak, meaning that it takes some time to develop characters on the
show, establish relationships between characters, and generally make the show “work”.
However, over time the quality diminishes. This may be because the writers run out of
ideas and the viewers get tired of the same old plot lines.
Substituting for qt and simplifying, lifetime profits from new seasons are the
following:
T 
 1 2
1
 pt (t  t 2 )  ct  .
(10)  n   
t 1 

t 1  1  r 
 2

In time period t the seasonal profits are


 1 2
1

 pt (t  t 2 )  ct  .
(11)  t  
t 1 

 (1  r )  2
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In order to determine how seasonal profits change over time, the first and second
derivative are presented for the seasonal profit function with respect to t, as follows:
(12)

 t 1 2
 p   p 2t
t
2

and

(13)

 2 t
  p2  0 .
t 2

Therefore the seasonal profit function can be determined to be concave over time. Profit
is the highest for the season closest to  . Assuming that the fixed cost is the same in
2

every period, if the revenue in this season is not greater than the fixed cost, the series will
not generate a profit during any season, which is often true for dramatic series. Even if
the series does make a profit in some seasons, it is still possible and likely that the profits
from those seasons are not large enough to cover the loss from the first few seasons,
which would typically be recovered during syndication of the show. However, because
of the current assumption that there is no syndication, a lifetime profit will also be
assumed. After the show starts making a profit, the show will maximize its lifetime
profit by creating new seasons until the profits from the last season are equal to zero.
Setting equation (11) equal to zero and solving for t, results in the following:
(14) t 


2



1
 2 p 2  8c
2p



1
 2 p 2  8c  T .
2p

and
(15) t 


2
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The season number given by equation (14) is the breakeven season, where revenue from
that season is exactly equal to the costs from that season. After that point the series
begins making a profit until the final season given by equation (15), where profits are
again approximately equal to zero.
Adding syndication does not change the potential profit that comes from creating
the new season, but creates additional revenue from the series. It can create a tradeoff
though between profits from the new season and profits from syndication. The profit
function including syndication is the following:





1  1 2
1
1
 T 
2





p
(
t


t
)

c

s
(
t

1
)

(16)    




t
t
t
t 1 
 (1  r ) t 1 
 (1  r ) t 1 st T
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t 1  1  r 
t

2
t

T
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T

Where the derivative of st, given by equation (5), with respect to T is the following:

(17)

st
  kT   1  0 .
(T )

Therefore, the price at which the producers can sell the seasons in syndication is
decreasing as the number of seasons that they have to sell increases. The second
derivative is the following:

(18)

 2 st
  (   1)kT   2  0 ,
T 2

showing that the price decreases at an increasing rate as the number of seasons increases.
By assuming that the revenue from syndication of a television series is only
dependent on the number of seasons available rather than the quality of the seasons, the
quality choice for the producers is unaffected by the ability to syndicate. However, the
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decision to produce additional seasons is still affected by the syndication market. The
series’ or inverse demand elasticity) will determine whether syndication increases the
optimal number of seasons or decreases it.
The effect of  can be seen by examining how the revenue from syndication
changes with different ’s, particularly the effect of a  equal to one, less than one and
greater than one. To start, revenue from syndication after the final season has been
produced is given by
 S t  kT   1 
The derivative of the revenue function with respect to the number of seasons is used to
determine how revenues change with the total number of seasons produced as follows:

(20)

S t
 (   1)kT   .
T

The effects of a unit elastic demand curve on the syndication revenue are first examined
by substituting for  = 1 in the first derivative,



S t
 (1  1)kT    0 .
T

Since the derivative is zero, the revenue does not change as T changes. In this case, the
revenue in a period is k regardless of how many seasons they sell in syndication, because
the price elasticity of demand is unit elastic. Therefore, the optimal number of seasons
would not change from the case where there is no syndication.
If  is less than one, equation (20) would be greater than zero. Therefore, when 
is smaller than one or when the demand is elastic, revenue is increasing in a period when
13

another season is added. In this case, the producers would actually increase the number
of seasons that they create compared to the case without syndication to maximize their
lifetime profits.
If  is greater than one, equation (20) would be less than zero. Therefore, when 
is greater than one or demand is inelastic, revenue is decreasing in a period when another
season is added. In this case, the producers might decrease the number of seasons that
they create compared to the case without syndication to maximize their lifetime profits.
Data
For this paper, data was collected from The Complete Directory to Prime Time
Network and Cable TV Shows: 1946-Present, Ninth Edition, including genre, and start
date and end dates, which were used to calculate the Season Number. In addition, the first
run Nielsen Rating5 and the day of the week and time the program aired was collected
from Network Programs by Designated Market Area published by Nielsen for each
November from 1980-1998. Finally, whether the show was syndicated in that year, the
equivalent national rating in syndication, and the number of households watching were
collected from the Report on Syndicated Program Audiences also published by Nielsen
for for each November in 1980 to 1988 and 1990 to 1997.
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics for the variables of interest. The
variable Length refers to the runtime of one episode of a series in minutes. The most
common runtimes for episodes are 30 and 60 minutes and the longest running program is
NFL Monday Night Football. On average episode length is about 47 minutes. The
variable Season Number corresponds to t from the theoretical model and refers to how

5

According to the Nielsen Media Research website, a rating is the percent of households with televisions
who are watching a program.
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many seasons the series has aired up to that point. In this data set, the average season
number is about 4 seasons. The series that ran for the highest number of seasons is a
Walt Disney anthology that played on Sunday evenings on ABC off and on for 35
seasons and was presented under several names including The Wonderful World of
Disney. The next longest running series are 60 Minute, with 30 seasons and NFL
Monday Night Football with 29 seasons, followed by the newsmagazine series 20/20,
with 20 seasons by 1998. All other shows in this data set had 15 seasons or less.
Table 1.1 Summary Statistics for First Run Shows
Variable
Length

Mean

Std Dev

Minimum

Maximum

46.58

20.17

30

195

Season Number

4.06

4.36

1

34

Number of Telecasts

3.40

0.83

1

5

12.83

5.85

1.3

42.8

11507.73

5045.24

21.76

37624

182.24

13.66

113

194

Residual Rating

0.00

4.03

-11.7224

24.5464

Canceled

0.40

0.49

0

1

Ever syndicated

0.41

0.49

0

1

Number of seasons syndicated

5.67

3.24

1

17

Sum of syndication ratings

7.59

13.43

0

121.5

Rating share
Number of Households
Number of Stations

Notes: Observations: 578 for number of syndicated seasons; 1115 for number of stations; 1395
for all others.

The variable for the Number of Telecasts refers to the number of episodes that
Nielsen used in a given year to calculate the ratings for that series in that year. The
variable Ratings Share is the actual Nielsen Rating reported in November of a given year
for the first run episodes of the prime time program. The average show season has a
Ratings Share of 12.83. This ranges from a low of 1.3 for the series DiResta and Legacy
both of which aired for only one season on UPN in 1998. The top rated show in this data
15

set is the Cosby Show in its 3rd (1986) season, with its 2nd (85), 4th (87), and 5th (88)
seasons being ranked 4th, 2nd, and 7th in Ratings Share, respectively. Rounding out the
top ten show seasons are the 4th (85) and 5th (86) seasons of Family Ties ranked the 6th
and 3rd, respectively, the 4th (1980) season of Dallas ranked 5th, the 1st (87) season of A
Different World ranked 8th, the 5th (86) season of Cheers ranked 9th, and the 12th (80)
season of 60 Minutes, ranked 10th.
One problem with this measure of ratings is that over time the average ratings for
a season has gone down due to the increased number of options during prime time,
including the introduction of new broadcast networks including Fox, the WB, and UPN,
as well as the number of cable stations that are available. In addition, the base of the
percentage rating has increased over time as the number of households with televisions
has increased. For example, the lowest rated show in 1986 has a Ratings Share of 4.6
which corresponds to a Number of Households equal to 3563 or approximately 3.5
million, while in 1998 a Ratings Share of 4.6 is equivalent to 4530 or approximately 4.5
million. The reason that this second issue must be considered is that the value to
advertisers comes from the actual number of people that view the show and not
necessarily from the percentage of people that see the show. Therefore, a show with the
same Ratings Share in 1980 and 1998, actually have a different value to advertisers. In
order to alleviate these problems the Residual Rating is used and presented below.
The Number of Households gives the average number of households that were
reported to watch an episode of a program in each November during the Nielsen
reporting period. This is the number used by Nielsen to calculate the Ratings Share. The
Number of Stations is the number of local television stations reported by Nielsen that
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aired the program during November. The Residual Rating is a normalized ratings
calculation used to account for the fact that ratings on average have gone down over time
due to the increased number of options available during prime time.
The variable Canceled is a binary variable, represented as a zero if the show
continues after that season or a one if that is the show’s final season in prime time. The
average value is .4 which means 40% of the show seasons in the data set are the final
season of the series. In fact, there are a large number of shows that are canceled after
their first season.
The variables describing the syndication of the shows include Ever Syndicated,
which is also a binary variable and is represented by a zero if the show is not found in the
syndication data series and a one if the show has been syndicated in at least one year.
About 41% of show seasons were syndicated in at least one year. The Number of
Seasons Syndicated represents that number of years the show was observed in
syndication, with an average number of years in syndication at approximately 5.67. The
Sum of Syndicated Ratings, which is the sum of the ratings observed for each year the
show is in syndication. The average is about 7.59 with a maximum of 121.5.
Empirical Analysis
The data for this paper is analyzed in several steps. The first step is to look at the
likelihood of being syndicated by type of program. Then the effects of various factors on
the show’s ratings are analyzed. Finally, a hazard model for the likelihood of being
cancelled is used to examine the effects of syndication on the decision to cancel the
program.
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In Table 1.2 the results of a Linear probability model show that all categories of
television shows are more likely to be syndicated than a variety program except Public
Service and Sports show, which do not have significant values. This is likely to be in
part due to the fact that there are only 2 observations in each of these categories.
Adventure dramas and Comedies are the most likely to be syndicated relative to Variety
programs, with General Dramas and Police Dramas also more likely to be syndicated
than variety programs.
Table 1.2 Likelihood of Syndication Ever by
Program Type
Variable
Coefficient
t-value
Intercept
0.204
5.41
Adventure
0.305
4.14
Comedy
0.280
6.71
Drama
0.167
3.56
Police
0.179
3.59
Public Service
-0.204
-1.75
Sports
-0.204
-1.79
2
R
0.051
Syndication Mean

0.404

Notes: Number of Observations: 1488. Linear probability
model estimates all relative to variety shows.

The next step of the analysis is a regression of the effects of the first run
characteristics of a show on the ratings of a show. The results of this regression are
shown in Table 1.3. This regression includes the program type, the network, the day of
the week, the start time of the show, the episode length of the show, the year, the number
of seasons, and the number of seasons squared. The variable Year is included because
overall ratings have fallen overtime and this will help to capture that trend. The variables
Season and Season Squared are used to capture the trend for increased for ratings to
increase during the first couple of seasons and then start to decline.
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Table 1.3 Estimated Ratings
Variables
Coefficient
Program Type
Adventure
-0.035
Comedy
1.271
Drama
0.955
Police
0.397
Public
0.531
Sports
1.470
Network
ABC
6.404
CBS
6.951
Fox
2.646
NBC
7.795
UPN
-0.306
Day of week
Friday
-0.771
Monday
0.948
Saturday
-1.489
Sunday
0.303
Thursday
2.009
Tuesday
1.468
Start Time
Length
Year
Season
Season Squared
R2

-3.958
-0.018
-0.464
0.934
-0.024
0.526

t-value
-0.05
2.52
2.14
0.84
0.5
0.94
7.49
8.11
3.01
9.15
-0.25
-1.94
2.2
-3.63
0.7
5.16
3.55
-1.12
-1.48
-20.83
15.06
-9.21

Notes: Observations 1395. Program types relative to
variety shows; networks relative to W; Day of week
relative Wednesday. Ratings are shares.

Overall, the program type does not appear to have a significant effect on the
ratings. Although, being a comedy or general drama may have a small positive
correlation with ratings relative to variety programs. The network does seem to have an
impact on ratings the three oldest and most established networks, ABC, NBC, and CBS
seem to get the best ratings with Fox’s ratings only slightly higher than the WB’s and
UPN’s ratings not significantly different from the WB’s. Day of the week has a small
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impact on ratings although not as big of an impact as the network. Thursdays generally
have the highest ratings relative to Wednesdays, and Saturdays generally have the lowest
ratings. The effects of Start Time and the Length of the show on the Ratings are not
significantly different from zero, and therefore, have little effect on ratings. The year of
the show does have a significantly negative effect as discussed earlier due to the fact that
there are an increased number of networks and therefore, options available.
A duration model is used for the analysis of this model. It will analyze the
probability of a show being cancelled in a particular season based on first run ratings and
the success in syndication, because the model assumes that producers can perfectly
predict how well a show will do in syndication. More specifically, the probability that a
show will be cancelled after episode t, conditional on the fact that episode t was made is
evaluated.
The probit model is used to analyze the effects of show characteristics on the
probability that the show will not be canceled in any given year. The models for NonSyndicated and Syndicated shows were estimated separately due to the hypothesized
differences on how syndication will affect cancelation. The results of this model are
displayed in Table 1.4.
The Probit model gives the probability of not being canceled in any given season.
From these estimates we calculate the cumulative probability of being canceled in each
year. The benchmark just for purposes of simplicity is NBC, Thursday, middle of the
programming evening, 1990. We assume average share and households for both nonsyndicated and syndicated programs, and same for other variables.
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Table 1.4. Probit Estimates of Non-Cancelation
Non-Syndicated
Syndicated
Independent Variables:
Coefficient
S.E.
Coefficient
S.E.
Intercept
-111.796
(26.689)
-127.035
(39.819)
Number of Seasons
0.109
(0.038)
-0.442
(0.071)
2
(Number of Seasons)
-0.005
(0.002)
0.017
(0.005)
Network
ABC
0.134
(0.141)
0.111
(0.194)
CBS
0.060
(0.146)
0.450
(0.224)
Fox
0.944
(0.206)
1.691
(0.346)
Day of Week
Friday
-0.110
(0.185)
0.027
(0.279)
Monday
-0.255
(0.193)
-0.323
(0.301)
Saturday
-0.126
(0.198)
-0.108
(0.282)
Sunday
0.120
(0.204)
0.155
(0.307)
Thursday
-0.389
(0.186)
-0.466
(0.269)
Tuesday
-0.267
(0.201)
-0.305
(0.286)
Start Time
5.056
(1.628)
2.312
(2.430)
Length
0.007
(0.003)
-0.008
(0.006)
Year
0.054
(0.013)
0.063
(0.020)
Number of Telecasts
0.157
(0.069)
0.157
(0.117)
Quarter Hour Rating
0.128
(0.046)
0.174
(0.047)
Share
Number of Households
9.169
(4.727)
7.016
(5.051)
Notes: Event estimated is probability of not being canceled. Observations: Non-syndicated
programs (356 non-canceled show years; 415 canceled). Syndicated programs (466 noncanceled show years; 112 canceled). Network effects relative to NBC; Day of week effects
relative to Wednesday.

Because the coefficients of the probit model cannot be directly interpreted the
cumulative probability of cancelation after the end of each season is calculated using the
estimates and presented in Table 1.5.
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Table 1.5. Cumulative Probability of
Cancelation after end of Each Season
NonSeason
Syndicated
Syndicated
1
0.38
0.05
2
0.59
0.15
3
0.72
0.30
4
0.80
0.50
5
0.85
0.69
6
0.89
0.84
7
0.91
0.93
8
0.93
0.98
9
0.95
0.99
10
0.96
1.00
11
0.97
1.00
12
0.97
1.00
13
0.98
1.00
14
0.98
1.00
The results show that syndicated shows are less likely to be canceled in seasons
one through six. Then after season seven a syndicated show is more likely to be canceled.
Thus the theoretical models predicts that shows that are syndicated have a more elastic
demand for seasons at a lower number of seasons and a more inelastic demand at a higher
number of seasons. Figure 1.1 below shows a graph of the cumulative probabilities of
Non-Syndicated and Syndicated shows being canceled after the end of each season. This
graph shows the obvious difference in the probabilities of cancellation between the two
types of shows.
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Figure 1.1

Conclusions
Syndication is a major player in the market for television series and is the main
reason that many dramatic programs are profitable. The extra revenues from this source
help to improve the quality of the programming that is available on television because the
higher costs can be covered with syndication even if they can not be covered by the sale
of the rights to the first run. The effects of syndication are an important factor in the
decisions of show producers.
The theoretical model in this paper predicts that if the demand for syndication is
elastic, the producers would actually increase the number of seasons that they create
compared to the case without syndication to maximize their lifetime profits. While if
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demand is inelastic, the producers might decrease the number of seasons that they create
compared to the case without syndication.
The empirical analysis includes a probit model that is used to calculate the
cumulative probability of being canceled in any given season. The cumulative
probabilities show that syndicated shows are less likely to be canceled in in the first six
seasons. This indicates that shows that are syndicated have a more elastic demand for
seasons in syndication at lower numbers of seasons. Then after season seven a syndicated
show is more likely to be canceled, predicting that the demand for seasons in syndication
is more inelastic in later seasons. Therefore, shows like Sienfeld and Friends may have
been canceled before the maximum first run profit was actually achieved.
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CHAPTER TWO
REGULATING REALITY:
EFFECTS OF THE FINANCIAL INTEREST AND SYNDICATION RULES
Introduction
Survivor, Big Brother, Celebrity Apprentice, I’m a Celebrity Get Me Out of Here
and Dancing with the Stars are just a handful of the reality programs that have been
plaguing the broadcast networks since the year 2000, while the 1990s were considered
the decade of the Sitcom with shows like Seinfeld, Frasier, Friends, and Everybody
Loves Raymond. Have you ever wondered what happened? Some may speculate that
Americans have gotten dumber. Do Americans really prefer the mindless entertainment
of reality shows? Not that a little mindless entertainment cannot be fun but what
happened to the wit and satire of the well thought out plot line and the perfectly timed
punch line? Is this shift to reality programs because these shows are so cheap to make or
is there more to the story? Could this shift be a result of the removal of the Financial
Interest and Syndication Rules (Fin-Syn Rules)?
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of the Fin-Syn Rules, which
were removed in 1995, on the programming offered by the broadcast networks. These
rules may have increased the incentives for the major broadcast networks to air dramatic
programming, including situation comedies (sitcoms) and dramas during the 70s, 80s,
and 90s, while decreasing the incentives for the networks to air reality type programming,
which includes game shows, news magazines, variety shows, and reality competitions.
Then when the rules were removed, shifting the rights of syndication ownership to the
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networks, they may have found it more profitable to shift to inexpensive programming
such as reality programs and reduce the number of dramas that they air.
This change in the incentives may or may not have been welfare enhancing to
society. The networks may be more efficient and profitable at making reality
programming, and therefore, the Fin-Syn Rules may have been welfare detracting,
because the rules may reduce the efficiency of the networks. However, it is also possible
that even though the reality programming is often more profitable for the networks, the
consumers may value it less than other types of programming. If this effect is large
enough the rules could be welfare enhancing.
The Fin-Syn Rules were enacted by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) in 1970 and phased out in the early 1990s being completely removed in 1995. The
two main reasons the rules were enacted are (1) to help independent producers and
independent television stations by limiting the power of the broadcast networks and (2) to
increase content diversity during prime time. The FCC could not directly control content
due to the First Amendment and thought that having many producers would help to
indirectly increase the diversity of the programming (Einstein 2004). The rules restricted
networks from taking a financial interest in the programs aired beyond the first run. One
of the arguments against the networks having a financial stake in the syndication of their
programs is that they would withhold these “high quality” programs from independent
stations, forcing them to air programs of lesser quality (Wildman and Robinson 1995).
Oba and Chan-Olmsted (2006) did find evidence that once the networks and producers
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integrated, syndicated programs did tend to be favored by affiliated stations. They,
however, did not find significant evidence of market foreclosure.
Although the Fin-Syn Rules appeared to do little to increase content diversity,
they did appear to effectively keep the independent producers in the market of producing
prime time television programs. In 1970, eleven of the top 20 producers in prime time
were independents. Then in 1989, nine of the top 20 producers were still independents.
However, by 1995, when the Fin-Syn Rules were officially revoked, there were only 15
companies producing regularly scheduled prime time programs for the top three networks,
six of whom were independent producers and the rest of which were the networks
themselves and major film studios. In 2002, there were only four independents and a
total of 10 companies producing programs for prime time, with ABC, NBC, and CBS
producing 63.6% of their programs (Einstein 2004). There was some consolidation of the
market over the more than 20 years that the Fin-Syn Rules were in affect; however, there
was a significant movement toward consolidation in the 10 years around the time they
were removed.
In the fall 1990 season, only 15% of the prime time schedules for the top three
networks were reality type programming. In fall 2002, reality programming was up to
25% and in fall 2007 it was taking up about 36% of the prime time schedule. Figure 2.1
shows the percent of reality type programming in prime time from 1964 until 2007. A
trend line is depicted in this chart as well and the dashed lines indicate the beginning and
end of the Fin-Syn Rules. It can be seen that the amount of reality programs decrease
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during the Fin-Syn era and increases steadily after it is over. However, it does appear
that this shift to reality programming does not really take off until about 1998.
Figure 2.1
Percent of Reality Programming Aired During Prime Time
Measured by Hours of Reality/Total Prime Time Hours
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This change in the programming mix is an interesting phenomenon. Although
this could easily be explained away by a change in consumer preferences, this is not an
economically interesting explanation. The hypothesis of this paper is that the
consolidation of the market after the Fin-Syn Rules were revoked gave the networks
some market power, particularly in the syndication market, which indirectly gave the
networks the incentive to produce more reality type programming and reduce the amount
of dramatic programming aired. Therefore, the fact that the networks control almost 64%
of what is produced during prime time gives them market power in the syndication
market. Indeed it is hard to deny the fact that the major broadcasting networks do have
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an increased interest in the syndication market. As of 2007, CBS Television Distribution
Group owned eight of the top 10 rated syndicated shows (Berman 2007).
However, in order for networks to take advantage of this market power in
syndication, they must actually own some stock of programs in this market. Therefore,
this shift to reality programs is likely to happen sometime after the networks gain the
rights to produce and syndicate their own programs, which could be why the major shift
to reality programs actually began about 5 years after the change in the rules.
Although the television industry had not been widely analyzed by economists,
there has been some very interesting and noteworthy research done. Wildman and
Robinson (1995) thoroughly analyze the market for syndication. They find that dramas
are the most likely to be syndicated but that comedies get the highest ratings in
syndication. They also find that non-fiction and variety shows are much less likely to be
syndicated. In general, it is also true that the market for syndication is usually the largest
for television shows aired during the prime time viewing hours on broadcast television
(Caves 2005). Therefore, if the networks own the rights to this syndication they would
have a strong hold on the market.
Another important point to note is that most types of reality programs are
produced at a much lower cost than dramatic programs (Caves 2005). This is because
reality type programs are less scripted than dramatic programs and therefore, do not
require the services of highly paid actors and as high quality or as many writers. They
are also usually shot on a much less elaborate and inexpensive set. Because of these
cheaper production costs, a reality program does not have to have as much advertising
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revenue in order to be as profitable as or more profitable than dramatic programs in the
first run.
A model proposed by Wildman and Robinson (1995) supports the hypothesis of
the model that I present in this paper and predicts that if the networks are behaving
competitively during the Fin-Syn Era, they will in fact increase the amount of “reality”
programming that they air while decreasing the amount of dramatic programming that
they air. While if the networks are acting together as a monopsonistic buyer during the
Fin-Syn Era, the opposite will happen. Preliminary, evaluation of the data suggests that
the networks were acting more competitively during that time period. Research by Barry
Litman in 1979 indicates that the networks did move to a more competitive programming
strategy during the late 1970s. If this phenomenon persisted this would support the
findings in the data.
In the next section, the theoretical model is established and analyzed. The
following section discusses the data necessary for empirically analyzing the hypotheses
attained from the model. This is followed by a discussion of the methods for empirical
estimation and the results. The final section concludes and summarizes the analysis.
Theoretical Model and Solution
Let us first examine and understand the model used by Wildman and Robinson
(1995). This simple model demonstrates the potential incentive for networks to move to
more reality programming even if this is not the preference of consumers and motivates
the hypothesis of this paper. Next, a model based on a single network is presented, which
shows that if the syndication market is monopolized by the network then the network will
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choose to air fewer shows with a high value of syndication. The last model used is a
stock and flow model, which reveals why the networks may not have made this move
immediately after the change in the law but started making this shift after some time.
In this first model from Wildman and Robinson (1995), the networks have m time
slots to fill and n programs from which to choose. For any program i, for i=1,…,n, the
present discounted value of the expected first run revenue is Ri, the present discounted
value of the expected syndication revenue is Si, and the present discounted value of the
production budget is Bi. Therefore, the present discounted value of the expected profits
for the lifetime of program i, are
(1) Di  Ri  Si  Bi .
Assuming a perfectly competitive market for syndication, where there are many
producers, the networks and the producers will negotiate to broadcast the m programs
with the highest total profits and split these profits between them.
However, if the networks own the rights to syndication and have some power in
the syndication market, economic theory tells us that they may be able to increase their
profits from syndication by reducing the quantity in the market. Traditionally, the
argument by independent producers and other interested groups has been that networks
would produce and air the program but withhold the program from the syndication
market. This model, however, makes a slightly different prediction.
If the network knows that it plans to withhold a particular program from
syndication the potential profits from the show becomes
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(2) Di  Ri  Bi ,
which is likely to make shows with lower production budgets and even potentially lower
first run revenues more profitable. This can be seen easily by comparing two programs
with equal potential profits, but where one has a higher syndication value than the other.
Consider the following:
(3) Ri  S i  Bi  R j  S j  B j , where S i  S j .
If the network ignores the syndication value, S, because it knows that it wants to withhold
the program from the market then the comparison that they make is
(4) Ri  Bi  R j  B j ,
where potential profits from show i are now less than the potential profits from show j. It
is often the case, as in reality programming versus dramatic programming, that Bj is
likely to be less than Bi, because most shows with high syndication values are more
expensive to make than those that are not very valuable in syndication. Therefore, it is
also possible that Rj is less than Ri. I assume here that the revenue from the first run is
the revenue generated by selling ad spots during the airing of the show. Since advertisers
are willing to pay more for larger audiences then it may be true that more consumers
prefer program i to program j, or that program i attracts a larger audience than program j.
However, the network will choose to air program j, thus making consumers worse off.
Next, a model of the lifetime profits of a single network under three different
conditions is presented. The three conditions presented for lifetime profits include a
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market with a single network during the Fin-Syn period that is acting as a monopsonist in
market for prime time programs, a single network during the Fin-Syn period that is acting
competitively, and a single network in the Post Fin-Syn period that has integrated with
the producers.
A single network is the most extreme case but shows how market power in the
syndication market could affect the choice of programming by the network. The parties
involved are the network, who sells primetime programming to consumers via ad sales,
the local television stations, who demand syndicated programming, and the producers,
who make the programming. The local television stations are network affiliates and must
show the network programming during primetime but may choose to air either
syndication or local programming during non-primetime hours. During the Fin-Syn Era
there are many producers, which are separate from the network, while during the Post
Fin-Syn Era the network and the producers have integrated and are one unit.
First, the Fin-Syn Era is examined. The primary market is the market for
primetime programming. The players in the primary market are the network and the
producers of the programs, where the network buys programs from the producers to air
during primetime. The producers can also sell the programs in a secondary market as
well. This secondary market is the market for off-network syndication. The players in
the secondary market are the producers and the individual television stations. However,
for a program to have value in this secondary market it must first air on the network in
primetime. This problem is analyzed from the network’s perspective.
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The network has Q time slots to fill during the primetime hours. They can fill
those time slots with shows that have a high value in syndication, q H , or with shows that
have no value in syndication, q N . For simplicity, all shows of type H are of equal quality
and have an equal value in syndication and all shows of type N are of equal quality.
Therefore, the total number of primetime slots, Q is
(5) Q  q H  q N ,
which can be rewritten as
(6) q N  Q  q H .
Therefore, the subscript on qH is suppressed going forward for simplicity. The inverse
demand curves which the network faces are represented by the following:
(7)  H (q)   H 0   H 1q .

(8)  N (Q  q)   N 0   N 1 (Q  q) .
Equation (7) is the inverse demand for primetime shows that have a high value in
syndication, q , where  H is the per season revenue that networks receive for a show.
Equation (8) is the inverse demand by the network for primetime shows that have no
value in syndication and  N is the per season revenue that networks receive for these
shows. The demand is derived from the revenue they can receive by selling ad time
during primetime, which advertisers base on the number of people watching. These
represent the demand curves for the primary market.
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In addition to the primetime demand for shows, the individual television stations
demand syndication with which to fill the time outside of primetime. This is the
secondary market. These are the same shows, qH , rerun at other times. The inverse
demand curve for syndication is represented as
(9)  S (qH )  S 0   S1qH ,
where  S is the per season price a television station pays for showing a show in
syndication.
It is assumed that there are n identical producers in the market. Therefore, each
producer, i, creates an equal protion,

1
, of the total quantities of each type of show. The
n

industry has the following costs of production:
(10) CH (q)  c0 q  c1 (q)2

(11) CN (Q  q)  c0 (Q  q)
As seen in equation (10), the cost of producing programs with a high value in
syndication, CH , is increasing in the number of programs produced, while equation (11)
shows that the cost of shows with no value in syndication, C N , is not increasing. This is
assumed because the talent, in particular the writers and actors that are needed to produce
shows with a high value in syndication are relatively scarce, while the resources for
producing shows with no value in syndication are abundant. It’s not hard to find
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someone willing to participate in a game show or reality program; people are ready and
willing to get their 15 minutes of fame.
The marginal costs of production is
(12) MCH (q)  c0  2c1 (q)

(13) MCN (Q  q)  c0
Typically, the producer will simply set marginal cost of production equal to the market
price. In the case of shows with high syndication value, however, the producers will
consider both the price they can get from the network for the first run and the price they
can get from the stations for the reruns. Therefore, the supply curve in the market for
new programs with a high value in syndication is sum of the marginal costs to the
producers minus the price for these programs in syndication, which is the following:
(14)  H (q)  c0  (2c1 )q   S ( q)
While shows with no syndication value have the following market supply:
(15)  N (Q  q)  c0 .
The next step in analyzing this problem is to examine the network’s behavior.
Two cases are examined here, one where the network behaves as a monopsonist and
recognizes their influence on the cost of television programs and another where the
network behaves as if it were perfectly competitive. First, the networks problem is
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analyzed as if it were a monopsonist. The network will maximize profits, which are
represented by the following function:
(16)  M   H (q)q   N (Q  q)(Q  q)   H (q)q   N (Q  q)(Q  q) .
The derivative with respect to q yields

(17)

 M
  H 0  2 H 1q   N 0  2 N 1 (Q  q)  c0  4c1q   S 0  2 S1q  co .
q

By setting the derivative equal to zero and rearranging the result is essentially
(18) MR  MC .
Thus the network will equate the marginal revenue of its programming to the marginal
cost across the two types of shows in order to maximize their profits. The marginal
revenue and marginal cost functions are the following:
(19) MRM   H 0  2 H 1q   N 0  2 N 1 (Q  q) .

(20) MCM  2(2c1  S1 )q  S 0 .
Solving the first order condition finds that the optimal number of shows with a high value
in syndication in the case of a monopsonist is
(21) qM 

 H 0   N 0   S 0  2 N 1Q
2( H 1   N 1  2c1   S1 )

If, however, the network behaves competitively in buying programming, their
profit function is
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(22)  C   H ( q)q   N (Q  q)(Q  q)   H q   N (Q  q) ,

where the cost to the network does not depend on the quantities of programming that they
choose. In this case the derivative, after substituting for  H and  N , is

(23)

 C
  H 0  2 H 1q   N 0  2 N 1 (Q  q)  c0   S 0  (2c1   S1 )q  co .
q

The marginal revenue and marginal cost in this case are the following:
(24) MRC   H 0  2 H 1q   N 0  2 N 1 (Q  q) .

(25) MCC  (2c1  S1 )q  S 0 .
The revenue portion of the profit function does not change in these first two cases.
Therefore, MRM and MRC are exactly equal. It is the marginal cost that changes in these
two scenarios.
In this competitive case, the optimal quantity of shows with high value in
syndication is
(26) qC 

 H 0   N 0   S 0  2 N 1Q
,
2( H 1   N 1  c1 )   S1

which yields the expected result that if they are acting as a monopsonist they chose a
smaller quantity of shows with a high value of syndication than if they are not.
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In the Post Fin-Syn Era, the only thing that changes in the model is that the
network and the producers integrate and become one entity. Therefore, the network now
has monopoly power in the syndication market and the profit function is
(27)  P   H (q)q   N (Q  q)(Q  q)   S (q)q  CH (q)  CN (Q  q) .
In this case the network is directly selling off network syndication itself. Therefore, the
demand for off network syndication moves to the revenue portion of the profit function.
Also, the network is the producer and incurs the costs of production directly. Thus, the
first derivative is

(28)

 P
  H 0  2 H 1q   N 0  2 N 1 (Q  q)   S 0  2 S1q  c0  2c1  co ,
q

and the networks marginal revenue and marginal costs in this case are the following:
(29) MRP   H 0  2 H 1q   N 0  2 N 1 (Q  q)  S 0  2S1Q

(30) MCP  2c1q
Solving for q yields
(31) qP 

 H 0   N 0   S 0  2 N 1Q
,
2( H 1   N 1   S1  c1 )

which is larger than qM but smaller than qC. Figure 2.2 shows a graphical representation
of these various equilibria. Therefore, if the network was utilizing its market power in
buying programs during Fin-Syn then the amount of programming with a high value in
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syndication will rise after the Fin-Syn rules are removed. However, if the network was
acting competitively during Fin-Syn then the amount of programming with a high value
in syndication will fall after Fin-Syn. In particular one might see fewer sitcoms and more
game shows and reality programming. This result is regardless of the fact that there were
no changes in the demand for either type of show by the audience.
Figure 2.2
Market Equilibria for One Network Model
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The last model used for this analysis is a stock and flow model. This model is not
fully developed yet but the idea is that there is some stock of syndication, Kt, available to
the market at any given time, t. The stock of syndication owned by producer, p, for p =
1,…,P, is kpt and the stock of syndication owned by network, n, is knt, for n = 1,…, N.
Therefore,
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P

N

p 1

n 1

(32) Kt   k pt   knt
The value of this stock depreciates over time at a rate of .
During the Fin-Syn period, this entire stock of syndication is supplied by the
producers of the television programs in a more competitive market.

Therefore, Kt = kpt

and knt = 0. It is also assumed that at the beginning of the period, the stock is in steady
state based on the competitive equilibrium, such that the replacement rate offsets the
depreciation. Once the Fin-Syn Rules are removed, the networks begin to produce their
own programming and they have to decide what type of programming to produce for
themselves. They know that they are gaining market power in the syndication market
and in order to take advantage of this they must produce shows with higher syndication
value. Therefore, initially, the networks produce shows with high syndication value in
order to build their stock of syndication. Over time the networks build their stock, while
the stock of the producers is depreciating. Eventually, a new lower steady state stock of
syndication is reached. Then as the quantity of syndication available in the market falls,
they can charge a price higher than that of the competitive market.
Figure 2.3 depicts a simulation of the dynamic process described above and
shows visually how the transition from independent producers to network ownership of
syndication might take place. The purple bars represent kpt, the stock of syndication
owned by independent producers. The light blue bars represent knt, the stock of
syndication owned by the networks. The black line represents the total amount of
syndication available at a given time. The older stock of syndication depreciates, because
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viewers get tired of watching the same show over and over again. However, new shows
are added every season to replace the depreciated stock. Therefore, at the beginning of
the time period, the independent producers are producing just enough new shows to offset
the depreciation of old shows in order to keep them at the steady state level of
syndication.
Figure 2.3
Stock of Syndication
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However, when the networks start anticipating the law change, they start
producing their own shows and stop buying as many shows from the independents. This
is when the stock of syndication owned by the networks starts to grow and the stock
owned by the independents starts to shrink to some minimal amount. In addition to this
transition in the production of programs, it is also possible that the networks start buying
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up the rights to old shows from the independents. The total stock of syndication may
grow at first, but over time the networks will reduce the level of syndication to a new
lower steady state, this is depicted in the graph as the flattening of the line. This process
could explain why the transition to reality programming was not immediate and possibly
why the late 1990s was seen as the sitcom era.
Data
The data necessary for the analysis of this theory include data collected from The
Complete Directory to Prime Time Network and Cable TV Shows: 1946-Present, Ninth
Edition, Neilsen’s Report on Syndicated Programs (ROSP), from 1980-1997 and 2004 to
2007. The fall schedules for each year, the network, number of seasons, seasons ranked
in the Top 30 for ratings, and genre have been collected from The Complete Directory to
Prime Time. The genres are divided into either Scripted (sit coms, dramas, etc) or Nonscripted (reality, newsmagazine, etc). The reason for this division is the distinct
differences in demand for syndication of sitcoms and dramas compared to other types of
programs. Data on which shows were syndicated in a given year as well as the average
syndication ratings, and the number of stations syndicating the program is being collected
from the ROSP for each year.
Table 2.1 describes the summary information on the data collected on the first run
programs. There are 1031 different shows in the data set, with only 812 of the shows
having data for the first season. The variable Total Seasons represents the total number
of seasons that a show aired in prime time. The variable Truncated is a dummy variable
that indicates whether the show was still being aired in the first run after 2006, the last
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year of the data set. First Season is the fall year of the first season of a show. Scripted is
a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the show is scripted and a value of zero if it is not.
Ranked Ever is a dummy variable that is a 1 if the show was ever ranked in the top 30 for
the season’s ratings. Ranked 1st Year is a dummy variable that is a 1 if the show was
ranked in the Top 30 for the first season’s ratings. The variable Syndicated is a dummy
variable that is a 1 if the show was ever syndicated and 0 if it has not. Nat Syn Rating is
the rating reported by Nielsen’s based on viewing in all designated market areas. Fin-Syn
(1990) is a 1 if the show was started prior to 1990, about 28.9% and Post Fin-Syn (2000)
is a 1 if the show started after the year 2000, about 25.9%. The number of shows in the
last six years of the data set is close in number to the number of shows in the first 10
years of the data set because there are only three networks in the beginning of the data set
while there are as many as six networks in the last six years.
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics for First Run Shows
Variables
Mean
Total Seasons
2.229
Running {0,1}
0.087
First Season
1994.140
Scripted {0,1}
0.929
Ranked Ever {0,1}
0.159
Ranked 1st Year {0,1}
0.118
Syndicated {0,1}
0.156
Syndication Rating
0.186
Fin-Syn (1990) {0,1}
0.289
Post Fin-Syn (2000) {0,1}
0.259

Std. Dev.
2.571
0.283
7.742
0.258
0.366
0.323
0.363
0.594
0.454
0.438

Notes: Obs 812 first-run shows with data for 1st year; 1031 total

Table 2.2 provides some additional information on the shows that were syndicated.
There are 899 show years that are observed in syndication. The variable Year is the year
a show was syndicated. National Rating is again the rating reported by Nielsen’s based
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on viewing in all designated market areas. DMA Rating is the average rating across each
designated market area that was carrying the program. Prior to 98 reflects the percent of
shows that are in the data set from 1980 to 1997.
Table 2.2. Summary Statistics for Syndication Data: 1980-1997, 2004-2007
Variables
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Year
1993.82
7.68
1980
2007
National Rating
1.70
2.06
0.04
12.9
DMA Rating
2.61
2.07
0.1
13.4
Prior to 98
0.76
0.43
0
1
Notes: Obs 899 except 897 for DMA ratings

The average data for individual shows is summarized in Table 2.3. There are 182
shows that are observed in syndication. First Year, Last Year and Middle Year are the
first, middle and last year respectively that a show is observed in syndication. National
Rating and DMA ratings are defined as above however in this data set they have been
averaged over each year that a show was syndicated. Again, Prior to 98 reflects the
percent of the data set that is from the period 1980 to 1997.
Table 2.3 Summary of Syndication Data Averaged by Show
Variables
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
First Year
1993.050
8.780
1980
Last Year
1999.030
7.464
1980
Middle Year
1995.790
7.592
1980
National Rating
1.439
1.060
0.1
DMA Rating
2.162
1.167
0.1
Prior to 1998
0.639
0.443
0

Max
2007
2007
2007
5.90
5.94
1

Notes: Obs. 182

Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis of the hypotheses in this paper is a multiple step process.
The first step is to show that the trend in broadcast programming on the three major
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networks has in fact changed over time to include more and more reality programming.
Therefore, the fall schedules for each year are analyzed to see if the percent of reality
programming on the networks does in fact increase and when it begins to change.
The next step of the analysis is a regression analyzing the effects the Fin-Syn and
Post Fin-Syn periods on the length of a program. Each observation in the regression is
the first season of each show. The regressors include dummy variables for Fin-Syn and
Post Fin-Syn with the transition period as the omitted variable, with one set of
regressions defining the Fin-Syn period from 1980 to 1989, the transition period from
1990 to 2000, and the Post Fin-Syn period as 2001 to 2006 and another set of regressions
defining the Fin-Syn period from 1980 to 1992, the transition period from 1993 to 1997,
and the Post Fin-Syn period from 1998 to 2006. In addition, there is either a dummy
variable called Ranked Ever or Ranked 1st Year indicating whether the show was ever
ranked in the top 30 shows for any season during its first run or whether the show was
ranked in the top 30 shows for its first season. The variable Syndication Rating, defined
as the average rating in syndication for all viewing designated market areas is used in
some regressions. The variable Running is used to control for shows that have not
completed their first run prior the end of the data set. The dummy variable Syndicated is
used in each regression to control for whether the show was ever observed in syndication.
Finally, the main variables of interest include the interaction variables between the
Syndicated and Post Fin-Syn variables and the Syndicated and Post Fin-Syn variables.
The final step in the empirical analysis is to calculate the change in the number of
seasons that a syndicated show runs between the Fin-Syn period and the Post Fin-Syn
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period. This will indicate whether networks are reducing the number of seasons in
syndicated series Post Fin-Syn. An F statistic is then calculated to provide the
significance level of the changes calculated.
The first part of the analysis is a test to see if the difference in the percentage of
reality prime time programming is significantly different during the non-Fin-Syn periods
and the Fin-Syn period. The average percent of prime time television dedicated to reality
programming in the Pre-Fin-Syn Era, between the years 1964 and 1970 was about 26%.
During the Fin-Syn Era, 1971-1993, the average percent of reality programming was
about 16%. Since the fall of the Fin-Syn Rules the percent of reality programming has
gone up to an average of about 27%, measured currently only using data from 1996 until
2007. Using a simple t-test rejects the null hypothesis that the Fin-Syn Era mean and the
Post Fin-Syn Era mean are equal with a probability of 2.41 x 10-5 or almost zero. This
preliminary test gives motivation to continue a deeper analysis.
Table 2.4 presents the results of the six regressions. The first three columns of
regression results are for the longer transition period from 1990 to 2000 and the last three
columns are for the shorter transition period from 1993 to 1997. The t-stats are given in
parenthesis below each coefficient. All of the regressions give similar results. However,
the regressions that use the variable Ranked Ever and the Syndication Rating have the
highest R-squared, while each regression in the set with the transition period from 1990
to 2000 has a slightly higher R-squared than each respective regression in the set with the
shorter transition period.
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Table 2.4 Length of Program Run
Variables:
Intercept
Fin-Syn
Post Fin-Syn
Ranked Ever
Ranked 1st Season
Syndication Rating
Running
Syndicated
Syndicated × Fin-Syn
Syndicated × Post FinSyn
R-squared
Change in Length of
Run
Prob(F) on Change

Coefficients/(t-stats)
Transition Period 1990-2000
Transition Period 1993-1997
1.448
1.473
1.600
1.427
1.459
1.635
(14.010) (14.530) (15.010)
(9.82) (10.230) (10.900)
0.062
0.056
0.038
0.078
0.051
-0.028
(0.360)
(0.330)
(0.210)
(0.43)
(0.290) (-0.150)
-0.656
-0.606
-0.695
-0.410
-0.371
-0.487
(-3.700) (-3.480) (-3.790) (-2.24) (-2.070) (-2.580)
2.391
2.180
2.412
2.199
(11.480) (10.510)
(11.52) (10.550)
0.878
0.887
(3.930)
(3.940)
0.998
1.255
1.001
1.261
(5.830)
(7.020)
(5.820)
(7.020)
2.327
2.068
2.551
2.203
1.947
2.423
(9.040)
(8.080)
(9.570)
(8.68)
(7.700)
(9.200)
3.461
2.232
2.574
3.594
2.350
2.702
(10.600)
(5.820)
(6.380) (11.21)
(6.180)
(6.760)
-1.369
-1.361
-1.161
-1.501
-1.467
-1.259
(-3.260) (-3.300) (-2.670) (-3.75) (-3.740) (-3.040)
-2.541
(-5.260)
0.492

-1.833
(-3.750)
0.513

-2.227
(-4.320)
0.456

-2.856
(-6.11)
0.488

-2.129
(-4.480)
0.509

-2.552
(-5.110)
0.452

-1.172
0.013

-0.472
0.321

-1.066
0.033

-1.355
0.003

-0.663
0.155

-1.293
0.008

Notes: Length of Program Run is total number of seasons that the show aired. The syn-fin rules
were phased out in the early 90s and completely removed in 1995. This allows for a transition
period both before and after as the change in the rules was anticipated and the market continued
to consolidate even more after 1995. This transition period is 1990-2000 in the first three columns
and 1993-1997 in the second three. Thus, the syn-fin period is alternatively measured by shows
first aired prior to 1990 in the former and shows first aired prior to 1993 in the latter. Syndication
rating is zero for shows never syndicated. Change in Length of Run is the difference between the
coefficient on the interaction Syndicated and Post-syn-fin and the interaction of Syndicated and
Syn-fin. The hypothesis test is that this is zero. The probability of the F statistic for this test is
shown in the last row.
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The Intercept for each regression indicates that the average length of a show that
starts during the transition period and is essentially not Ranked and not Syndicated lasts
approximately 1.5 seasons. A show that is not syndicated during the Fin-Syn period is
likely to last slightly longer than a show that is not syndicated during the transition period.
Although the last regression that uses Ranked 1st Season instead of Ranked Ever and the
shorter transition period gives the opposite result. While a show that is not syndicated
during the Post Fin-Syn period is likely to be about half a season shorter than a show that
is not syndicated during the transition period. The coefficients on the Ranked Ever
variable shows that being ranked in the top 30 for at least one of the show’s seasons
increases the number of seasons by more than 2. However, being ranked in the first
season of the show only increases the length of a show by about 0.9 seasons. The
coefficient for Syndication Rating indicates that an increase in the average ratings in
syndication of 1 percentage point increases the number of seasons by about one. The
coefficient for Syndicated means that a show that is syndicated during the transition
period is two or three seasons longer than those not syndicated during the transition
period. The full effects of the interaction variable Syndicated*Fin-Syn are calculated by
adding up the coefficients for the Fin-Syn, Syndicated, and Syndicated*Fin-Syn.
Therefore a show that is syndicated during the Fin-Syn period is about one season longer
than a show that is not syndicated during the transition period, while a show that is
syndicated during the Post Fin-Syn period is about the same length as a show that is not
syndicated during the transition period, which is calculated by adding up the coefficients
for Post Fin-Syn, Syndicated, and Syndicated*Post Fin-Syn.
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Finally the change between the Fin-Syn and Post Fin-Syn periods in the length of
a show that has been syndicated is calculated. This change is about 1 to 2 seasons and is
significant at the 5% level for 4 of the 6 regressions. This supports the hypothesis that
programs headed to or in syndication were cut short in first-run during the Post Fin-Syn
period.
Conclusions
This paper proposes that the removal of the Financial Interest and Syndication
Rules in 1995 changed the incentives for the networks to air more reality programming
even if these programs are less popular and receive lower ratings than dramatic programs.
This hypothesis is evaluated using a model borrowed from Wildman and Robinson (1995)
and a profit maximization model using one network as well as a stock and flow model to
help explain the timing of the shift.
The Wildman and Robinson model shows that if a network wanted to withhold a
show from syndication that it may be more profitable to make a show with a lower value
in syndication that costs less to make, even if audiences value that show less in the first
run than a show which has a higher value in syndication. This would make audiences
worse off. The next model shows explicitly that if a network had monopoly power, the
network would in fact produce fewer shows with a high syndication value.
An analysis of the fall schedules for the three major networks reveals that the
mean percentage of reality programming on during prime time is significantly different
before and after the Fin-Syn Rules were revoked. This supports the hypothesis that the
rules gave the networks the incentives such that they increased the reality programming
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that they aired, now showing more games shows, reality shows, and news magazines. In
addition, the regressions used to estimate the changes in the average length of a
syndicated program shows that there is a significant change in the length of these
programs between the Fin-Syn and Post Fin-Syn periods. This change supports the
hypothesis that the networks shorten the length of the syndicated shows that they air
during prime time.
Considering that the evidence found here does support the theory that the major
networks may be taking advantage of their market power in the syndication market and
that it affects not only the syndication market but also the prime time market as well. The
potential welfare effects in both of these markets should be evaluated to determine if
there is a net loss to society. The potential welfare loss in the syndication market would
stem from a reduced quantity of programs and/or seasons of programs available for
syndication. While in the prime time market the welfare loss would stem from lower
viewer satisfaction and potentially lower advertising revenues. If there is a net loss to
society, a policy change should be considered to help correct this welfare loss and
maximize social welfare.
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Appendix A

Market Structure Diagrams 1970 to 1995 (Fin-Syn Era)
I. First Run Market

II. Off-Network Syndication Market
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Appendix B

Market Structure Diagrams 1995 to Present (Post Fin-Syn Era)
I. First Run Market

II. Syndication Market
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